I. Introduction
In a previous article, Trump and the “Before Doctrine”: Deterrence, I argued that a growing segment of U.S. strategy is no longer structured around classical deterrence—waiting, responding, balancing—but around a different logic: anticipating, closing the board, and reducing an adversary’s room for maneuver before conflict erupts.
Since then, a series of seemingly disconnected statements and decisions have begun to form a coherent pattern. Greenland, the Arctic, tariffs, pressure on European allies, and the explicit framing of China as the central threat are not isolated events, but expressions of a single strategic architecture.
This article continues and deepens that initial argument. Not to defend any particular political figure, but to examine a structural shift in how great powers now understand sovereignty, territory, and strategic time. The central thesis is straightforward: geography has returned to the core of power, bringing with it a hard—but coherent—redefinition of what it means to control, defend, and sustain international order in the 21st century.
II. Greenland Is Not an Island, It Is a Problem
For decades, Greenland was perceived as a remote territory, more relevant to school maps than to strategic decision-making. Yet in recent years—and most explicitly in statements by U.S. President Donald J. Trump—Greenland has moved to the center of global security discourse.
To many observers, these statements appear exaggerated or provocative. Why would a sparsely populated territory, formally under Danish sovereignty for centuries, suddenly be described as “sacred land” essential to the security of the United States and the world?
The short answer is simple: the world has changed more profoundly than most states are willing to acknowledge.
Great powers no longer compete solely for political influence or diplomatic prestige. They compete for routes, angles, and positions from which access to space, trade, and military mobility can be secured or denied. In this new strategic environment, Greenland ceases to be peripheral and becomes a critical node.
What is at stake is not a real estate transaction or a symbolic dispute among allies. What is at stake is whether emerging Arctic routes, next-generation defense systems, and the architecture of Western security will be controlled by actors capable of sustaining them—or left vulnerable to rival powers that fully understand their strategic value.
From this perspective, tariff threats, references to China and Russia, and blunt assessments of Europe’s defensive limitations are not isolated outbursts. They are indicators of a deep doctrinal shift: a transition from geopolitics based on formal arrangements to geopolitics grounded in real capability.
III. Effective sovereignty: when flags are no longer enough
To understand why Greenland has become a focal point of geopolitical tension, it is necessary to revisit a concept that diplomacy has softened for decades but never removed from strategic thinking: effective sovereignty.
Formally, sovereignty is defined by legal recognition over a territory. It is the sovereignty of treaties, official maps, and flags. Yet throughout history—particularly in periods of great-power competition—this definition has consistently proven insufficient.
History repeatedly shows that sovereignty which cannot be defended, sustained, and projected is inherently fragile, and that under high strategic pressure it is eventually challenged.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that actors such as the United States increasingly evaluate territories not by legal title alone, but by their operational value. The central question is no longer simply “who owns this land?”, but rather:
- Who can credibly defend it?
- Who can invest in and maintain strategic infrastructure?
- Who can integrate it functionally into a broader security architecture?
When these questions lack clear answers, a territory ceases to be a passive asset and becomes a systemic vulnerability.
This is precisely where recent discussions about Greenland begin to make strategic sense. The argument is not that Danish sovereignty is legally illegitimate, but that it is strategically insufficient in the context of global competition with powers such as China and Russia.
In other words, the issue is not who owns Greenland on paper, but who can ensure that it does not become an entry point, pressure node, or structural weakness in a future conflict.
This line of reasoning may be uncomfortable for those who still view the international order as a static system governed exclusively by norms and consensus. Yet in periods of historical transition—and the current moment is one—norms tend to yield to material capability.
In this context, sovereignty ceases to be a declaration and returns to what it has always been at its core: a function of real power.
IV. Classical geopolitics: when the map takes control
For many contemporary readers, geopolitics appears to be an outdated discipline, supposedly replaced by global economics, international law, or commercial interdependence. Yet every time the international system enters a phase of structural tension, geopolitics reasserts itself, reminding us of an uncomfortable truth: geography never stopped mattering.
The ideas now resurfacing in debates over Greenland, the Arctic, and maritime routes are not new. They were formulated over a century ago by thinkers grappling with a fundamental question:
Which territories, routes, or positions allow a power to sustain dominance over time?
One of the earliest to address this was Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued in the late 19th century that global power depended on control of sea lanes. For Mahan, territorial size or population was insufficient; whoever dominated the seas controlled trade, and whoever controlled trade could sustain global power.
Later, Halford Mackinder offered a complementary land-based perspective. His heartland theory suggested that control over the Eurasian continental core could grant decisive advantage over maritime powers. In its most famous formulation, Mackinder warned that dominance over Eastern Europe could lead to control of the world’s heartland—and ultimately global influence.
It was Nicholas Spykman, however, who provided the synthesis most relevant to the present era. Spykman argued that neither exclusive sea power nor absolute continental control was sufficient. What truly mattered was control of the rimland: the coastal fringes and corridors where land and sea intersect, where trade, mobility, and defense converge.
From this perspective, power is not concentrated in a single core, but in critical routes and choke points. Canals, straits, maritime passages, archipelagos, and transitional zones become the true nodes of the international system.
This logic explains why seemingly secondary territories can acquire disproportionate importance at certain historical moments—not because of their size or population, but because they connect, block, or redirect flows of goods, energy, information, and military force.
Greenland fits squarely within this classical framework. It is neither a heartland nor a naval power in itself. It is a rimland territory, a component of the Arctic rim that links North America to Europe and Eurasia. As the Arctic shifts from a natural barrier to a navigable corridor, Greenland’s strategic value increases accordingly.
From the standpoint of classical geopolitics, then, U.S. interest in Greenland is neither strange nor impulsive. It follows a well-established logic: secure the corridors before others do.
V. The 21st century: when territory becomes a system
The fundamental difference between classical geopolitics and 21st-century geopolitics lies not in principles, but in the nature of the means. Routes still matter, choke points still exist, and geography continues to shape power. What has changed is that territory is no longer just space—it is an active component of complex technological systems.
For much of the 20th century, the Arctic functioned as a natural barrier. Ice, extreme climate, and lack of infrastructure rendered it marginal from an operational standpoint. Today, that reality is rapidly disappearing. Progressive ice melt and technological advancement have transformed the Arctic into an emerging transit zone, both for commerce and military projection.
This transformation profoundly alters the global strategic balance. Arctic routes shorten transit times between Asia, Europe, and North America, reshape the relevance of traditional maritime chokepoints, and create new opportunities for the deployment of submarines, sensors, and early-warning systems. In this new environment, controlling the Arctic means controlling an upper layer of global mobility.
This is where Greenland definitively ceases to be a passive territory and becomes a technical component of power. Its geographic position enables not only the monitoring of emerging sea routes, but also the integration of air defense, missile defense, and advanced detection systems. In other words, territory is no longer merely the stage upon which systems are deployed—it becomes part of the system itself.
This point is essential to understanding seemingly abstract references, such as the “Golden Dome” mentioned in recent U.S. strategic discourse. Modern defensive systems—both offensive and defensive—depend on angles, distances, Earth curvature, response times, and sensor coverage. They cannot be designed in isolation. They require specific territories to function at peak efficiency.
From this perspective, sovereignty takes on a new dimension. The question is no longer only who governs a territory, but who can integrate it coherently into a technological security architecture. A poorly defended or underutilized territory is not neutral—it is a vulnerability that others may exploit.
In an era of systemic competition, no great power can afford to leave critical nodes in its strategic environment outside its functional control. The logic is no longer expansionist in the classical sense, but preventive and structural: ensuring that the system works before it is tested.
VI. China, Taiwan, and the logic of “before”
Once effective sovereignty, route control, and technological integration are understood, a central question remains:
What is the board being reorganized for—and why now?
The answer challenges many conventional analyses: the primary strategic adversary of the United States is no longer Russia, but China. Not because Russia has become irrelevant, but because China represents a systemic challenger, not merely a regional disruptor.
Russia operates as a destabilizing force: applying pressure, exploiting gaps, generating friction. China, by contrast, builds—infrastructure, supply chains, alternative routes, industrial capacity, and technological ecosystems. Its strategy is not oriented toward immediate confrontation, but toward reshaping the structural conditions of the international system until the balance tilts in its favor.
This is where time becomes the decisive variable.
Unlike past conflicts, U.S.–China competition does not revolve around a fixed date, but around a strategic window. Within that window, Taiwan occupies a pivotal position.
For years, Chinese leadership has explicitly framed “reunification” with Taiwan as a finite objective rather than an open-ended aspiration. Beyond rhetoric, what matters is that this framing introduces a clear temporal horizon into strategic planning—linking political intent with industrial, technological, and military synchronization.
For the United States, this fundamentally alters the logic of classical deterrence. Waiting for conflict to erupt before responding is no longer viable. In a scenario where China has secured routes, resources, logistical depth, and sustained mobilization capacity, delayed reaction would be structurally disadvantageous.
This is where the “before doctrine” becomes clear:
- Before China can project sustained force.
- Before alternative corridors are consolidated.
- Before economic interdependence turns into strategic dependence.
From this perspective, U.S. actions are not designed to provoke conflict, but to constrain the adversary’s operational space. Securing critical resources, controlling key routes, and neutralizing strategic vacuums is not escalation—it is structural preparation.
The objective is not to prevent China from acting tomorrow, but to ensure that if it does act, it cannot do so on favorable terms.
VII. When economics replaces the cannon
Once the systemic adversary, the time factor, and the territorial-system logic are established, Greenland emerges not as an anomaly but as a model case of the new power paradigm.
The proposed acquisition, paired with explicit tariff threats, should not be read as a conventional commercial negotiation. It represents strategic coercion without war, a mechanism designed to alter state behavior without direct military force.
From this perspective, the tariffs announced by Donald J. Trump serve a precise function:
not economic punishment, but the reintroduction of cost to sovereignty that is not effectively exercised.
For decades, European countries—including Denmark—have benefited from an international order in which security was largely externalized. North Atlantic defense, nuclear deterrence, and systemic stability were sustained in large part by American resources, technology, and military presence.
Within that framework, Greenland remained formally sovereign yet strategically underdeveloped. That condition ceased to be acceptable once the global environment shifted from relative cooperation to systemic competition.
Economic coercion operates here as a functional substitute for war. Instead of occupying territory, pressure is applied. Instead of imposing force, incentives are recalibrated. The message is unmistakable:
if a territory is critical to global security, it cannot remain under a sovereignty incapable of sustaining it.
This approach is not aimed at humiliating allies or dismantling agreements. It is intended to close strategic gaps. In a system where China and Russia actively probe entry points, ambiguities, and gray zones, indecision itself becomes a vulnerability.
In this sense, Greenland is not the end goal, but the precedent. It marks the transition from symbolic sovereignty to logistical sovereignty, and the moment when economics becomes an instrument of strategic alignment.
VIII. When geography returns to collect its debt
For much of the post–Cold War era, the notion took hold that geography had lost relevance. Global trade, multilateral institutions, and economic interdependence seemed to have tamed conflict. Maps still existed, but many behaved as if they no longer mattered.
That assumption was always fragile.
History shows that whenever the international system enters a phase of structural competition, geography reasserts itself—not as academic nostalgia, but as a physical constraint. Routes, distances, choke points, and dominant positions impose conditions that no narrative can override.
What we are witnessing today—from Greenland to the Arctic, from Taiwan to energy corridors—is not an anomaly, but a reversion to older rules, updated by technology. Territory never ceased to matter; it was merely temporarily cushioned by an order that no longer holds.
In this context, the “before doctrine” is neither aggressive nor exceptional. It is a rational response to an environment in which waiting means surrendering structural advantage. Great powers do not prepare for war because they seek it, but because they understand that arriving late to it is often worse than attempting to prevent it through anticipation.
Historically, the most costly mistake has not been preventive action, but prolonged denial. Empires, states, and alliances have fallen not for lack of norms, but for clinging to mental frameworks no longer aligned with material reality.
Greenland, in this sense, is not the center of the world. It is a symptom. It signals the moment when symbolic sovereignty, strategic ambiguity, and reliance on others cease to be sustainable. It marks the point at which geography returns to collect its debt.
Understanding this in time does not guarantee stability. Ignoring it, however, almost always guarantees conflict under worse conditions.
IX. Author’s Note
This article does not emerge from political neutrality. It emerges from conviction.
I am fully aligned with the foreign policy approach advanced by the administration of President Donald J. Trump, not for partisan reasons, but because I believe it represents one of the few contemporary strategies that recognizes—without euphemisms—the true nature of the international system: competitive, geographical, and ultimately constrained by effective power.
The so-called “before doctrine”—anticipating, closing routes, reducing structural vulnerabilities, and acting before conflict becomes inevitable—does not strike me as an anomaly or an eccentricity, but as a rational response to a scenario of systemic competition with powers such as China. When facing an adversary that plans over decades, waits patiently, and accumulates structural capabilities, strategic passivity is not prudence; it is negligence.
Holding this position does not mean ignoring the costs, tensions, or controversies it generates. It simply means refusing to deceive ourselves. History shows that states which decline to see the world as it is—and instead retreat into formalism or comforting narratives—often pay that error with losses in sovereignty, influence, or stability.
This text, therefore, does not aim to please everyone. It aims to state clearly what many analysts think but few are willing to articulate openly: that geography has returned, that strategic time has accelerated, and that anticipation is not aggression, but a form of survival in a world that has already moved beyond the illusion of a permanent order.
X. Annotated Bibliography
Classical Geopolitics
- The Influence of Sea Power upon History — Alfred Thayer Mahan
- ➝ Foundational work on maritime power and the control of commercial and strategic sea routes as a basis of global influence.
- Democratic Ideals and Reality — Halford J. Mackinder
- ➝ Introduces the heartland concept, framing land power and Eurasia as the core of global strategic competition.
- America’s Strategy in World Politics — Nicholas J. Spykman
- ➝ Develops the rimland theory, essential for understanding coastal zones, corridors, and regions such as Greenland and the Arctic.
- The Sources of Soviet Conduct — George F. Kennan
- ➝ Classic formulation of containment theory, serving as a historical precursor to modern strategic anticipation.
- Arms and Influence — Thomas C. Schelling
- ➝ Explores deterrence, coercion, and the use of power without direct warfare, highly relevant to economic and strategic pressure mechanisms.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Reports
- ➝ Official strategic framework defining China as a systemic challenger and outlining U.S. priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
- The Long Game — Rush Doshi
- ➝ Analyzes China’s long-term strategy for accumulating structural power within the international system.
- Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom — Barry Scott Zellen
- ➝ Examines the Arctic as an emerging strategic frontier shaped by climate change, technology, and great-power rivalry.
- Council on Foreign Relations, reports on Arctic routes and security
- ➝ Contemporary analysis of the Arctic’s growing geopolitical value, focusing on maritime corridors, security, and sovereignty.
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